This paper summarises the standard account of the economic calculation debate, the modern Austrian reinterpretation of the debate based on the centrality of tacit knowledge and discovery, and a neglected third strand in the historical debate, Dobb's insistence on the uncertainty associated with atomistic decision making and the need for ex ante planning. It then draws some lessons for socialists from the debate and considers a possible market socialist response to the modern Austrian challenge. The paper ends by outlining a model of participatory planning which incorporates both the modern Austrians' insight into the importance of tacit knowledge and Dobb's insistence on ex ante coordination.
Introduction
The economic calculation debate in the 1920s and 1930s was about whether it was possible to have rational economic calculation in a socialist economic system, denned as state ownership of the means of production. The two principal sides in the debate were economists from the Austrian school, who denied that it was possible, and economists working within a neoclassical framework, who claimed that it was. The standard account of the debate has been that the socialist side won, although for 30 years or so after the summing up article of Bergson (1948) it was regarded mainly as part of the history of economic thought, with little or no relevance to contemporary discussion of socialism.
In the 1980s, however, the debate revived. The modern Austrian school contested the standard account, arguing that it was based on a misunderstanding of the original Austrian challenge and that a proper understanding of the Austrian position finally disposes of the possibility of an effective economic system not based on private property and market forces. This renewed challenge to the possibility of socialism was one of the contributory factors in the revival of work on socialist economic models in the past decade. However, while some of this work refers to the calculation debate (e.g., Cornell and Cockshott, 1993) , in our view the modern Austrian critique remains so far effectively unaddressed and unanswered. This paper offers an explicit response to the modern Austrian challenge. Section 2 briefly rehearses the standard account and evaluates the claim that if the debate is interpreted as having taken place within a neoclassical framework then neoclassical market socialism won. It then considers the Austrian renaissance in the 1980s, with its emphasis on discovery and entrepreneurial activity and its claim mat such activity must necessarily be based on private ownership. It is this claim that underlies the renewed Austrian challenge to the very possibility of socialism. While neoclassical market socialism may have successfully rebutted the original Austrian challenge interpreted within a neoclassical framework as relating to rational calculation and incentives, it is irrelevant as a response to the modem Austrian challenge based on the learning and discovery aspects of the market process.
In addition to the Austrian and neoclassical market socialist contributions to the original debate there was a third strand, Dobb's contribution, which is discussed in Section 3. Dobb claimed that die decentralised models of the neoclassical socialists did not capture the essence of socialism since they did not incorporate planning. He stressed the unavoidable uncertainty associated with atomistic decision making, especially in relation to investment, and argued diat the neoclassical socialist models were as vulnerable to the weaknesses of ex post as opposed to ex ante coordination of investment decisions as was any capitalist economy. However, Dobb's contribution was peripheral to the main debate and the force of his argument has subsequently been weakened by its association with the Soviet model of central planning.
Section 4 draws some lessons for socialists from the calculation debate, both die historical debate and its recent revival. It suggests that although the modern Austrian analysis correctly emphasises the importance of tacit knowledge, its advocacy of capitalism as die only effective way of mobilising such knowledge fails to confront satisfactorily the insights of Dobb's contribution concerning the inefficiencies of atomistic decision making. Dobb's analysis, however, fails to recognise die importance of tacit knowledge and this failure makes his advocacy of central planning unconvincing as it stands.
One guise in which die Austrian socialist referred to by Kirzner in the opening quotation might appear is as an Austrian, as opposed to a neoclassical, market socialist. This possible 'Austrian market socialist' response to die modern Austrian challenge is considered in Section 5 and rejected on two grounds. First, it seeks to simulate capitalism on die basis of state-owned property activated by entrepreneurs in the context of market forces, and the conditions diat have to be met to achieve this are such as to render die retention of formal state ownership artificial and redundant. Second, and more importantly from our point of view, as with all Austrian approaches it necessarily fails to address the issues raised by Dobb.
Section 6 sets out our explicit response to the modem Austrian challenge-a model of participatory planning. In it we contest the view that the discovery of tacit knowledge is possible only dirough entrepreneurial activity in the market process and argue diat participatory planning would promote die discovery and social mobilisation of dispersed tacit knowledge more efficiendy. We dien set out die prerequisites for participatory planning and provide an oudine of an institutional framework through which a process of negotiated coordination might occur.
Our conclusion, in Section 7, is diat it is a mistake to regard centralised command planning and market forces as the only ways of coordinating economic activity. The Austrian insight into the nature of knowledge and Dobb's insight into the nature of market forces, taken together, point to the superiority of a cooperative as opposed to a coercive or competitive process for promoting discovery.
The standard account and the modern Austrian response
According to the standard account, as Lavoie (1985) shows in his comprehensive survey, the first stage of the debate consisted of the Mises (1920) challenge that rational economic calculation is theoretically impossible under public ownership. However, it then emerged that this challenge had already been refuted by Barone (1908) , with the implication that Mises had either ignored or been unaware of Barone's contribution. The second stage of the debate, in the standard interpretation, then took the form of Hayek's (1935A) retreat to a second line of defence, based on practical objections to the computational and informational problems involved in solving Barone's simultaneous equations. The third stage was associated with the name of Lange (1938) , who definitively disposed of the alleged practical impossibility of rational calculation under public ownership by developing a decentralised market socialist model within a Walrasian framework.
Lange's pioneering model has since been modified and fine-tuned, so that there now exists a wide range of decentralised procedures, differing in their informational requirements, computational algorithms and the environments within which they can operate efficiently. In these models, prices or quantities are adjusted, or firms' production sets are approximated, by an iterative procedure that is accomplished within a pseudo-market mechanism, and all these models can be shown to replicate the efficiency (Pareto optimality) property of the theoretical neoclassical capitalist economy (see, e.g., Hurwicz, 1974; Vohra, 1987) .
The earlier models, however, do not address intra-firm organisational problems, since firms are treated as 'black boxes'. Once input is supplied output is obtained, with no consideration of 'shirking' or the costs of monitoring and contract enforcement. More recent models seek to overcome this naive conceptualisation by recognising that shirking may be partially overcome by supervision and that the 'principal-agent' problems that arise when firms are run by a managerial body rather than by their beneficial owner(s) may be partially dealt with by monitoring and incentive schemes. It is important to note, however, that these problems are structurally the same whether the owner is the Planning Bureau in a market socialist system or the stockholders in a corporate capitalist system. Given this symmetry between a neoclassical corporate capitalist and a neoclassical socialist economy, any mechanisms devised to deal with the problems generated by a principal-agent relationship give exactly the same power (or lack of power) to the principals of both systems to induce their agents not to act game-theoretically (see, e.g., Bergson, 1978; Pak-Wai Lui, 1986; Radner, 1986) .
There remains the question as to whether the Planning Bureau would be as motivated as stockholders in designing and implementing these schemes. The findings of portfolio and capital market theory suggest that there is no convincing theoretical support for the argument that private property has intrinsic efficiency claims in this regard that are absent in the case of public property. While individual voters will have difficulty in actively monitoring the Planning Bureau, dispersed shareholders will tend to 'free-ride' rather than actively monitor managers. Although the discipline exerted by the capital market in a capitalist economy is absent in a socialist economy, the evidence suggests that capital markets are inefficient. One response to this has been to propose intermediary institutions to monitor management on behalf of shareholders, but this course of action is equally available in a socialist economy (see, e.g., Fama, 1977; Stiglitz, 1985; Bardhan and Roemer, 1992) .
Thus, if the calculation debate is interpreted as having taken place within a neoclassical framework, neoclassical market socialism should indeed be declared the victor. There is no theoretical justification for the claim that private ownership is a necessary precondition for an efficient economic system. However, this standard interpretation has been vigorously contested by the Austrian rejoinder of the 1980s (see, e.g., Vaughn, 1980) . Lavoie (1985) argues strongly that the discovery and learning aspects of the market mechanism that are central to the modern Austrian school had already been discussed in the early contributions of Mises in the 1920s and 1930s , with the implication that there was no retreat by the Austrian camp during the historical debate. On this reading, the neoclassical socialist school of the 1930s misinterpreted the basic concepts used by the Austrians, casting them within a Walrasian paradigm, and ipso facto missed the point. Kirzner (1988) , on the other hand, insists that the Austrian approach should be seen as having been developed through the calculation debate, and that its crystallisation became apparent only after the 1930s. His reading is that Mises and, in his early writing, Hayek had not clearly conceptualised their position and differentiated it vis-a-vis that of the neoclassicals, and hence that they invited their opponents to interpret the Austrian challenge as based on computational and, to a lesser degree, motivational grounds. The neoclassical responses based on this interpretation (i.e., Lange-type decentralised solutions), according to Kirzner, then led the Austrian economists to clarify their analysis of the dynamic aspects of markets as processes of discovery and learning.
Whichever reading of the historical calculation debate is preferred, there is general agreement that the focus of modern Austrian analysis is not the allocation of limited resources with alternative uses among unlimited wants but the market process itself, the ways in which dispersed and fragmented tacit knowledge about an economic world that is continuously changing is socially mobilised through rival entrepreneurial activities. Thus, the means-end nexus of economic life in the Austrian setting turns out to be not given but subject to creative human action-'a voyage of exploration into the unknown' (Hayek, 1945, p. 101) .
Within these discovery and learning processes, the Austrian view underlines the vital role, or roles, assumed by the entrepreneur. The Misesian-Kirznerian entrepreneur plays an equilibrating role by detecting and exploiting what others fail to notice, while the Schumpeterian entrepreneur plays a disequilibrating role by innovating new production systems (Schumpeter, 1942; Mises, 1940 Mises, /1963 Kirzner, 1973) .' As many commentators have noted (see, e.g, Barry, 1984) , in die Austrian vision the concepts of entrepreneurship and rivalry replace the neoclassical concept of the Walrasian auctioneer adjusting the prices to which economic agents respond in an automated way.
2 Underlying this change is a fundamental difference in understanding of the nature of information, with the Austrians insisting that knowledge cannot be objectified, codified or transferred, but must rather be discovered in the course of entrepreneurial activity in the market process. Only through knowledge which is revealed during this market process is the participant able to surpass the limits of her/his ignorance. As Lavoie puts it: 'Like verbal conversation, the dialogue of the market depends on the specific give-and-take of interaction, a creative process of interplay in which the knowledge that emerges exceeds that of any participants' (Lavoie, 1990, p. 78, emphasis added) .
These epistemiological standpoints draw a very distinctive frontier between the Austrian and neoclassical perspectives. Hence, while neoclassical market socialism may have successfully rebutted the original Austrian challenge interpreted within a neoclassical framework, it turns out to be irrelevant as a response to the modem Austrian challenge based on the centrality of tacit knowledge and the learning and discovery aspects of the market process.
One possible response to the modern Austrian challenge would be to design the Austrian socialist model for which Kirzner, tongue in cheek, says he is waiting. Most Austrians would object to such a project, on the basis that market economic institutions are necessarily dependent on private property rights. However, since the neoclassical literature on portfolio and capital market theory cited above suggests that a necessary link between private property and market incentives cannot be convincingly established, and such a link has not been demonstrated by Austrian economists either, the Austrian market socialist project cannot be ruled out a priori. Before discussing this possibility, however, the position of Dobb, the third contributory party to the debate, will be presented.
Dobb's contribution to the economic calculation debate
Dobb's crucial contribution to the economic calculation debate was to insist that the definition of socialism as an economic system should not be confined to a change in the legal ownership status of the means of production but should also embrace economic planning. He argued that the neoclassical economists on the socialist side were preoccupied with the static issue of the allocation of given resources among alternative uses and paid little or no attention to dynamic issues (Dobb, 1935A,B, 1937 (Dobb, 1935A,B, , 1939 (Dobb, 1935A,B, , 1953 (Dobb, 1935A,B, , 1960 (Dobb, 1935A,B, , 1969 see, also, Adaman, 1993) . Widening the analysis from the static to the dynamic dimension is of great importance in Dobb's perspective. As he put it, once dynamic considerations are taken into account 'an atomistic market economy will be essentially short-sighted' owing to the narrow horizon of a firm's vision necessarily set by 'uncertainty as to what the macroscopic constellation of the economy is likely to be at future dates' (Dobb, 1969, p. 148, emphasis added) . Only planning, according to Dobb, could overcome this short-sightedness.
For Dobb, the advantages of planning on the production side are threefold. First, where there are close interconnections among different sectors and industries it is much easier to coordinate decisions before they are implemented than after. Similarly, planning has the ability to embrace the wider social effects of production that fall outside the private calculations of atomised decision-making units. These wider effects Dobb identifies as, inter alia, the influence of the development of one industry or sector on the possibilities for others, joint demand and supply, the infrastructure, infant industries, and the existence of substantial indivisibilities in capital equipment.
Second, through planning it is possible to overcome the uncertainties which are 'inherent in production for a market when each autonomous decision is necessarily "blind" in part with respect to related decisions' (Dobb, 1935A, p. 535) , thus minimising time-lags in adjustment. In this context, Dobb points out that the consequence of ex post coordination are particularly severe in relation to investment decisions:
[FJirstly, because fixed investment is concerned with crystallising labour and resources in durable forms, so that once this has been undertaken the process of 'revision' of initial decisions by subsequent shifts in market prices can operate only after a considerable lapse of time; secondly, since current investment by changing both productive capacity and employment can exercise an important influence upon market prices. (Dobb, 1960, p. 6) Thus, he concludes that taking decisions concerning major economic activities in a coordinated way and in advance of any commitment of resources would overcome the likely occurrence of fluctuations and bottlenecks, and hence would increase economic efficiency.
Third, things which figure as 'data' in the static problem can be converted through planning into 'variables' in a dynamic framework. Among these decisions Dobb counts: the rate of investment; the distribution of investment between capital goods and consumer goods industries; the choice of techniques; the regional distribution of investment; the relative rates of growth of transport, fuel and power, and agriculture, in relation to industry; the rate of introduction of new products and their character; and the degree of standardisation or variety in production that the economy at any stage of its development feels able to afford (Dobb, 1953, p. 77 et seq.) .
Dobb also indicates the need for planning in consumption, in order to deal with issues such as collective wants, external economies of consumption, and complementarity in consumer demand. In summary, the planning of production and consumption, according to Dobb, would make possible the overcoming of the imperfections of knowledge necessarily associated with the market process. It is this dimension that Dobb argued for during the debate, insisting that the need for planning was as valid in relation to the iterative models of the neoclassical market socialist school, based on mimicking the working of a capitalist economy, as it was in relation to the capitalist economy itself.
We consider Dobb's analysis to be of fundamental importance for an understanding of the capitalist economic system and the design of a model of socialist planning. However, it is important to remember that Dobb's view of knowledge was essentially the same as that of the neoclassical school. In arguing that the uncertainties necessarily associated with the atomistic decision making that lies at the heart of the operation of market forces could be overcome through ex ante planning and coordination he assumed that major interconnections and interdependencies would be objectively known. Hence he failed to take account of the Austrian insight into the subjective and tacit nature of knowledge.
Lessons from the economic calculation debate
The static nature of the neoclassical contribution to the calculation debate has been criticised by both the modern Austrians and Dobb, albeit clearly from different angles. Since the decentralised and uncoordinated organisational form of a market economy inevitably generates imperfections of knowledge, Dobb emphasised the desirability of coordinating economic activity in advance through planning. However, he perceived these imperfections as having a technical nature and argued that they could be relatively easily corrected by a Planning Bureau. He thus failed to take account of the Austrian insight regarding the tacit nature of knowledge and the processes of learning and discovery.
1
According to the Austrian vision, on the other hand, the crux of the matter of economic calculation is the fact that dispersed knowledge exists only in a tacit form, waiting to be discovered by active participants vying to outstrip one another in the process of searching out attractive buying and selling opportunities and creating new products and production processes. When the issues with which Dobb was concerned are raised, the Austrian school does not deny that the ex post coordination of the market mechanism produces these effects, but argues that this is inherent in the nature of economic reality. As expressed by Kirzner (1973, p. 232) : 'To describe the competitive process as wasteful because it corrects mistakes only after they occur seems similar to ascribing the ailment to the medicine which heals it, or even blaming the diagnostic procedure for the disease it identifies.' Thus, both Dobb and die Austrian school were almost totally occupied during the debate with a critique of the neoclassical socialist school and, as such, they did not really consider one another's respective visions (with die exception of an early exchange between Hayek (1935A) and Dobb (1935B) ). What has emerged from our evaluation is that we have identified two sources from which imperfections of knowledge arise: first, the tacit nature of dispersed knowledge, as argued by the Austrian school, with the consequence that knowledge cannot be transferred, objectified or codified; and, second, the decentralised and uncoordinated form of a (real or pseudo) market economy, which leads Dobb to advocate central planning in order to replace ex post by ex ante coordination (see Adaman, 1993) .
2
The Austrian approach recognises both sources of imperfection, but does not accept any need to address the second type. Ex ante coordination of economic activity, according to this school, is an impossibility, since planning as a way of controlling and coordinating entrepreneurial activities necessarily brings about the loss of agents' autonomy, and hence the potentiality for them to discover their tacit knowledge and put it to use. However, although the Austrian analysis correctly emphasises the importance of tacit knowledge, its advocacy of capitalism as die only effective way of mobilising such knowledge does not deal with the insights of Dobb's contribution concerning the inefficiencies of atomistic decision making. Dobb, on the other hand, while insisting on die need to deal with die consequences of atomised decision making, fails to recognise die importance of tacit knowledge and this failure makes his advocacy of central planning unconvincing as it stands.
In our view, the lesson for socialists from the calculation debate is mat attention should be focused on die possibility of combining planning widi the articulation of tacit knowledge. In this context, we start by asking whether an Austrian market socialism is feasible and, if it is, whether it is desirable in the sense of successfully incorporating die insights of Dobb as well as those of die Austrians.
Austrian socialism-feasible and if so desirable?
Could the conflict alleged to exist within the Austrian framework between state ownership and entrepreneurship be resolved, or are these two concepts necessarily contradictory to each other within that framework? An early attempt to replace the 'socialist manager' by the 'socialist entrepreneur' is found in Liska's model, based on the leasing of state-owned production units to private entrepreneurs through competitive bidding. Although nobody can appropriate the ownership of a production unit, since both the existing means of production and new investment are in the hands of the state, the highest bidder can acquire control of it and use it to pursue the most profitable opportunities he/she perceives. In the case of subsequent overbidding, the operating entrepreneur must either accept the higher valuation or leave the business to the overbidder (Liska, 1963; see also Barsony, 1982; Varga, 1982; Macrea, 1983; Nuti, 1988A,B, 1990 ). Liska's emphasis is on the 'human assets' of entrepreneurs, which are in the end manifested as a residual surplus that belongs to the entrepreneur. Hence his model can be seen as a design for the use of state-owned production units in an entrepreneurial way. Liska's model seems to cover only the better utilisation of existing production units, paying no attention to the question of innovation and new investment. Brus and Laski, however, adopt a more fully developed Austrian approach, as is evident in their critique of the Lange model:
The neoclassical theory, and consequently the [Lange model] , takes the taumnement mechanism with the auctioneer as a justified abstract generalization of an actual process occurring in a market economy. However, . . . the Walrasian model overlooks the true central figure of the capitalist system, namely the entrepreneur sensu strtcto. Formally there are entrepreneurs in the Walrasian model, but they behave like robots, minimizing costs or maximizing profits with the data given. Their behaviour is that of pure optimisers operating in the framework of exclusively passive competition, reduced to reactive adjustment of positions to an exogenous change. (Brus and Laski, 1989, p. 57) In their model of 'market socialism proper', Brus and Laski face the issue of innovation and new investment head on, seeking to combine 'state ownership in one form or another' with 'full independence of firms and true entrepreneurship' by introducing a capital market alongside product and labour markets (Brus and Laski, 1989, pp. 105 and 132) .
This line of reasoning appears to provide what Kirzner has been waiting for, since the need to foster entrepreneurial activity is explicitly recognised and mechanisms to achieve this within a public ownership environment are built into the model. Thus, although no one has yet labelled herself/himself as an 'Austrian socialist', there seems to be no logical barrier to using Austrian premises in designing an economy based on public ownership. Not surprisingly, however, the conditions that have to be met to achieve this are such as to render the retention of formal state ownership both artificial and redundant. Indeed, Brus and Laski themselves end by raising the question of why have state ownership at all in such a model (Brus and Laski, 1989, p. 146 et seq.) . Thus, while the model may be logically possible, the question remains as to whether it is economically coherent.
Furthermore, even if it is accepted that this approach refutes the modern Austrian challenge that socialism is logically impossible, by showing that learning and discovery processes (and thus the articulation of tacit knowledge) can be combined with public ownership, the question of desirability still needs to be considered. The Austrian market socialist approach aims to replicate capitalism on the basis of state-owned property activated by entrepreneurs in the context of market forces. However, it fails to address the issues raised by Dobb and therefore it does not meet our test of desirability, denned as the incorporation of the insights of both the Austrians and Dobb.
The following section, on the other hand, attempts to give an explicit response to the modern Austrian challenge by setting out the framework of an economic organisation, which we call participatory planning, in which the two insights are effectively incorporated and the discovery and social mobilisation of dispersed knowledge are more efficiently promoted than in either Austrian capitalism or Austrian market socialism. Dobb's insight into the necessary imperfection of knowledge associated with atomistic decision making and the Austrians' insight into the tacit nature of knowledge are both powerful. At a technical level, Dobb identifies the fundamental systemic problem of capitalism (and also of market socialism; see Devine 1992) , while the Austrians identify the fundamental systemic problem of centralised administrative command planning (and also of neoclassical market socialism). Yet Dobb's advocacy of central planning fails to address the Austrians' insight, and the Austrians' advocacy of the capitalist market fails to address Dobb's insight. Participatory democratic planning (unlike market socialism) offers a way of combining the two insights (Adaman, 1993) .
The Austrian school recognises the imperfections of knowledge arising from both tacit knowledge and ex post coordination. It identifies market processes activated by entrepreneurs as the way in which tacit knowledge is discovered and mobilised, but holds that ex post coordination and the problems arising from it must be accepted, since planned coordination ex ante is impossible. Dobb recognises the imperfection of knowledge arising from ex post coordination and argues that it can be overcome by planned coordination ex ante. However, he does not recognise the tacit nature of knowledge and his model of planning is based on the neoclassical assumption of given data.
The participatory planning alternative seeks to combine planning with the articulation of tacit knowledge. At first sight, such a task seems impossible. Planning, for Dobb, involves restrictions on the autonomy of enterprises and hence affords little scope for economic agents to participate actively in decision-making processes in order to discover and articulate their tacit knowledge. Yet the way in which the Austrians understand the process of discovery and articulation categorically rules out planning. The contradiction arises, however, because in neither context are there institutions that facilitate participation. Instead, people are subject to the coercive power of either administrative commands from the hierarchically organised planning mechanism or market forces operating with inherently unpredictable and unintended consequences.
Democratic participatory planning is envisaged as a process in which the values and interests of people in all aspects of their lives interact and shape one another through negotiation and cooperation. In the course of this process tacit knowledge is discovered and articulated and, on the basis of that knowledge, economic decisions are consciously planned and coordinated. Before oudining a model of participatory planning, however, two prerequisites should be noted.
First, if participation in the social process of discovery is to be real, people must have access to the necessary material and personal resources and opportunities. This highlights a striking paradox in the Austrians' position. While insisting on the universal importance of tacit knowledge, they also insist that such knowledge can only be discovered by entrepreneurs competing in a market process based on private ownership. This necessarily excludes the tacit knowledge of non-entrepreneurs from the social process of discovery and mobilisation. It follows that if Kirzner's criterion for judging the efficiency of institutional arrangements ('their ability to promote discovery' 1 ) is adopted, there is a prima facie case that market processes based on private ownership are socially inefficient. A set of institutional arrangements that generalises access to the social process of discovery would not only be more democratic and more just but also more efficient.
A clarification may be in order here. One interpretation of the Austrian position is that anyone who is alert to the possibility of new opportunities and through action discovers whether her/his perceptions and expectations are realised is an entrepreneur. Thus, on this interpretation, workers participating in a firm's internal activities might qualify as entrepreneurs. However, both the historical and the modern Austrian critiques of the theoretical possibility of socialism are based on the premise that state ownership and the market process are incompatible, with the consequence that for modern Austrians it is the absence of private ownership that makes discovery through entrepreneurial participation in the 'dialogue of the market' (Lavoie, 1990, p. 78) impossible. On this second interpretation, entrepreneurship is denned as active participation in the market process by privately-owned enterprises acting independently of one another, and entrepreneurs are those who control the enterprise and decide how it will engage in that process. Since capitalist enterprises are controlled either by owner managers or by corporate managers access to the social process of discovery is therefore narrowly restricted.
The second prerequisite for participatory planning is that decision making at all levels takes place through a participatory process involving all those affected by the decision. This contrasts sharply with the Austrian position, in which participation is confined to the micro level. For Austrians, this is not a matter of choice but a necessary fact of life. As Hayek put it:
The main point of emphasis is that the conflict between, on the one hand, advocates of the spontaneous extended human order created by a competitive market, and on the other hand those who demand a deliberate arrangement of human interaction by central authority based on collective command over available resources, is due to a factual error by the latter about how knowledge of these resources is and can be generated. (Hayek, 1988, p. 7) However, it is mere assertion to state that social processes of discovery can only take the form of rivalrous behaviour in markets based on private ownership. Participatory planning at each level of decision making would enable knowledge of previously unarticulated interests, possibilities, and interdependencies to be discovered and articulated, through a process of social interaction among those affected.
It is precisely this possibility that enables a more general social mobilisation of tacit knowledge than that envisaged by the Austrians to be combined with the ex ante coordination of major interdependent decisions that Dobb considered to be the essence of planning. At the same time, participatory planning, unlike Dobb's concept of planning, is not vulnerable to the Austrian critique that central planning is premised on a misunderstanding of the tacit nature of knowledge.
The two prerequisites for participatory planning may be linked by the concept of social ownership (Devine, 1988) . Social ownership is neither private ownership nor state ownership, but rather ownership by those who are affected by the use of the assets involved. The principle underlying the concept of social ownership is that the right to decide on the use of assets, and therefore the ownership of assets, should be vested in those who are affected by their use. This will vary according to the assets involved. Thus, the set of people who are affected by the use of the assets of an individual enterprise will be less inclusive than the set of people who are affected by the use of the assets involved in the interdependent investment decisions of the industry to which the enterprise belongs. Social ownership at the level of the enterprise, defining the set of people who would participate in enterprise decision making, will be different from social ownership at the level of the industry, where a wider set of people would participate. Similarly, participatory planning at the level of a national economy, or the global economy, would involve social ownership and decision making by (the representatives of) those affected by decisions over the use of assets taken at those levels.
A framework for participatory planning based on social ownership (Devine, 1988 ) will now be outlined by considering the decision-making process at the levels of the enterprise and the industry. Those affected by the activities of enterprises include: their workers and customers; the communities and regions within which they are located; the more general interests represented by the relevant regional, national or global planning commission, depending on the geographical reach of their operations; and campaigning groups concerned with particular issues, such as the environment or equal opportunities. All these interests would be represented on the governing boards of enterprises, which would decide on general policy concerning the use of existing capacity. The issues in question would include the sort of decisions on the use of existing capacity currently made by the boards of capitalist enterprises, but there would be two major differences. First, the board would consist of representatives of all the 'stakeholders' making up the social owners, not just the owners of capital, and thus the range of interests and tacit knowledge embraced would be more extensive. Second, this tacit knowledge would be mobilised through a process of negotiation among all the beneficial interests and hence principalagent problems would be minimised. At the level of the enterprise, therefore, generalised participation would promote generalised discovery.
Enterprises would set prices equal to long-run average cost, calculated on the basis of labour costs, a centrally determined capital charge, and the prices of producer goods used as inputs. These prices would be the basis on which market exchange would take place between the enterprise and its customers, who might be other enterprises or consumers. In general, there would be alternative sources of supply, so that the demand for an enterprise's output would generate information about the extent to which it was producing what customers wanted. There would be no attempt to coordinate ex ante transactions between producers and users. The degree of capacity working and the state of order books and inventories in an industry as a whole would indicate whether the aggregate capacity of the industry needed expanding or contracting. Thus, the need for changes in an enterprise's capacity would arise as a result of its performance relative to that of other enterprises in the industry and/or as a result of an imbalance between industry supply and demand.
In capitalist economies changes in capacity and the structure of productive assets come about not through market exchange but as a result of the operation of market forces, through individual enterprises acting atomistically in response to their perceptions of profit opportunities and engaging in investment or disinvestment. In the neoclassical vision this is a purely passive response; in the Austrian vision it involves entrepreneurial activity and the process of discovery integrally associated with it. In our model of participatory planning market forces are replaced by a process of negotiated coordination among those who would be affected by changes in capacity and the structure of productive assets. This would take place in what can be called negotiated coordination bodies, made up of representatives of the stakeholders, the social owners, comprising the set of affected interests. The negotiated coordinated body for each industry or sector would include: all the enterprises in the industry; customers, i.e., consumer organisations, government agencies, or major user industries; major supplying industries; the sections of the global, national or regional planning commission concerned with innovation, new investment and regional distribution; and other groups with a legitimate interest in the set of decisions at issue.
Negotiated coordination bodies would be responsible for deciding what changes in the capacity of their industry were desirable, how they should be achieved, and how differential performance among enterprises in the industry should be dealt with. They would have three sorts of quantitative information available to them: first, accounting data on the performance of each enterprise, generated by the use of their existing capacity (i.e., by market exchange); second, estimates of expected changes in demand or costs in relation to existing activities; third, estimates of expected demand and costs in relation to potential product or process innovations. They would also have available to them two sorts of qualitative information, supplied by the representatives of the different interests participating in the negotiation process: first, judgements about the reasons underlying differential performance by enterprises; second, the views of those affected about the economic and social situation prevailing in the communities and regions in which investment or disinvestment might occur, the priorities for regional distribution agreed through the democratic political process, and the concerns of other interests represented.
The crucial distinction between the use of existing capacity and changes in capacity has been crystallised by disaggregating the concept of the market into market exchange (use of existing capacity) and the operation of market forces (the way in which changes in capacity occur in the market mechanism). The model of participatory planning we have oudined retains market exchange, but replaces market forces by die process of negotiated coordination. Thus the problem of 'too many meetings' often raised in relation to participatory models does not arise with the same force that might apply if it were being proposed to replace market exchange by the negotiated ex ante coordination of all transactions.
1 Furthermore, the amount of time spent in meetings in modern capitalist economies should not be underestimated. North (1984) has suggested that in the advanced capitalist countries as much as half of GNP may be accounted for by transactions costs arising from increasing division of labour and organisational complexity, and the growth of alienation, self-interested behaviour and policing associated with antagonistic social relationships. Participatory planning based on social ownership would enable the articulation of tacit knowledge and the process of discovery to be combined with the planned ex ante coordination of interdependent investment decisions. It would take place in an institutional context which promoted cooperation and the recognition of interdependent common interest rather than individualistic self-seeking behaviour.
A central principle of the model is openness of information. All the available information relating to enterprises would be publicly available. Given the cross-cutting representation of affected interests on enterprise boards and negotiated coordination bodies, information bias and principal-agent problems would be minimised. Regular audits would provide accounting information on the use being made by each enterprise of the part of society's productive assets entrusted to it. The decision-making process would be informed by the input of all parties to the negotiation, in the course of which their latent tacit knowledge would be discovered and mobilised. As part of this process, past decisions would be evaluated in the light of their outcomes, mistakes would be corrected, impossibilities and new possibilities would be discovered, and learning would occur. Thus, while interdependent decisions would be coordinated as far as possible ex ante, through a process of negotiation that enabled discovery and learning before resources were committed, implementation would result in further discovery and learning ex post that would enable subsequent correction in the next round of decision making. However, these integrated processes of ex ante and ex post decision making would be based on cooperative negotiation rather than coercion or competition.
In summary, a model of participatory planning through negotiated coordination, based on social ownership, allows the insights of both the Austrians and Dobb to be taken into account. Tacit knowledge is discovered and mobilised, interdependent investment decisions are planned and as far as possible coordinated ex ante, and generalised participation enables the social process of discovery to be accomplished more efficiently than in either administrative command or capitalist economies.
Conclusion
We have argued that if socialism is defined as state ownership of the means of production, both neoclassical and Austrian market socialism are theoretically possible in their own terms. However, we rejected neoclassical market socialism because of its vulnerability to the insights of both the Austrians and Dobb into the sources of imperfections of knowledge. We rejected Austrian market socialism because of its vulnerability to Dobb's insight, and also Dobb's model of central planning because of its vulnerability to the Austrians' insight. Finally, we identified participatory planning as a process that incorporates both insights, noted two prerequisites for such a process, and outlined a possible model of participatory planning.
Thus, the theme of this paper has been that the economic calculation debate can still provide important insights for thinking about whether a socialist economy is possible and, if so, how it might be organised. The intellectual climate of our postmodern age discounts the possibility of purposeful, rational human action. Planning, understandably, has come to be associated with grand designs gone wrong. The sobering experience of the Soviet experiment has reinforced Hayek's judgement of socialism as 'The Fatal Conceit' and his advocacy of a more modest 'spontaneous extended human order' (Hayek, 1988, p. 7) .
However, the lessons of the calculation debate for socialists are misspecified if they are presented as establishing the need to choose between 'collective command' and 'spontaneity'. By drawing on the Austrian insight into the nature of knowledge, and combining it with Dobb's insistence on the benefits of planning, socialists may be able to rediscover and reinforce their underlying belief in the ability of people to create a self-governing society of self-activating subjects. The key to any future that socialism may have is likely to be found in the combined concepts of participatory democracy and participatory planning.
